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Achieving Secrecy Capacity of the Wiretap Channel
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Abstract—The wiretap channel model of Wyner is one of the
first communication models with both reliability and security
constraints. Capacity-achieving schemes for various models of the
wiretap channel have received considerable attention in recent
literature. In this paper, we show that capacity of the general
(not necessarily degraded or symmetric) wiretap channel under a
“strong secrecy constraint” can be achieved using a transmission
scheme based on polar codes. We also extend our construction to
the case of broadcast channels with confidential messages defined
by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner, achieving the entire capacity region of
this communication model.
Index Terms—Polar codes, chaining construction, strong se-
crecy, coordinate partition.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel model W was introduced by Wyner
in 1975 [29]. In this model, there are two receivers Y,Z
and a single transmitter X . The transmitter aims at sending
messages to Receiver 1 through a communication channel W1.
The information sent from X to Y is also received by Receiver
2 through another channel W2. The transmission problem in
the system W(W1,W2) calls for designing a coding system
that supports communication between X and Y in a way
that is both reliable and secure. The reliability requirement
is the usual one for communication systems, namely, that the
error probability of decoding the information by Y be made
arbitrarily low by increasing the block length of the encoding.
At the same time, the transmission needs to be made secure in
the sense that the information extracted by Receiver 2 about
the message of X approaches zero as a function of the block
length.
To describe the problem in formal terms, denote the input al-
phabet of the transmitter by X, and the output alphabets of the
channels W1 and W2 by Y and Z, respectively. The messages
that the transmitter can convey to Receiver 1 form a finite set
denoted below by M. For transmission over the channel the
message is encoded using a mapping f : M→ XN , where XN
is an N -fold repetition of the input alphabet. We say that f is a
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length-N block encoder of the transmitter. Capacity-attaining
schemes for the wiretap channel rely on randomized encoding,
i.e., a mapping that sends M to a probability distribution on
XN . In other words, the message m ∈ M is encoded as
a sequence xN ∈ XN with probability f(xN |m), and the
encoder is defined as a matrix of conditional probabilities
(f(xN |m))xN∈XNm∈M .
The decoder of Receiver 1 is a mapping φ : YN →M. We
also denote by PY |X and PZ|X the conditional distributions in-
duced by the channels W1 and W2, respectively, and define the
induced distributions PY N |XN , PZN |XN , where, for instance,
PY N |XN (yN |xN ) =
∏N
i=1 PY |X(yi|xi), where yi and xi refer
to the i-th symbol of the vectors yN and xN , respectively.
Definition I.1. We say that the encoder-decoder pair (f, φ)
gives rise to (N, )-transmission over the wiretap channel W
if for all m ∈M∑
xN∈XN
f(xN |m)PY N |XN (φ(yN ) = m|xN ) ≥ 1−  (1)
and
I(M ;ZN ) ≤ , (2)
where M is the message random variable (RV) and ZN is the
RV that corresponds to the observations of Receiver 2.
In Definition I.1, Eq. (1) represents the reliability of commu-
nication condition while (2) answers the security of transmis-
sion requirement. We note that in many works on transmission
with a secrecy constraint the security condition was formulated
in a more relaxed way, namely as the inequality
(1/N)I(M ;ZN ) < . (3)
This is particularly true about pre-1990s works in information
theory, but also applies to some very recent works on the
wiretap channel, e.g., [25], [11], [15]. However, as shown by
Maurer in [17], [18], this constraint does not fulfill the intuitive
security requirements in the system. More specifically, it is
possible to construct examples in which inequality (3) is
satisfied and at the same time Receiver 2 is capable of learning
N1− out of N bits of the encoding xN . In view of this,
Maurer suggested (2) as a better alternative to condition (3). As
a result, currently (3) is called the “weak security constraint”
as opposed to the stronger constraint (2). In this paper we
design coding schemes that provide strong secrecy, so below
we work only with condition (2).
The secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel is defined as
follows.
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Definition I.2. The value R > 0 is called an achievable rate for
the wiretap channel W if there exists a sequence of message
sets MN and encoder-decoder pairs (fN , φN ) giving rise to
(N, N ) transmission with N → 0 and 1N log |MN | → R
as N → ∞. The secrecy capacity Cs is the supremum of
achievable rates for the wiretap channel.
The following theorem provides an expression for Cs.
Theorem 1. ([9]; see also [10, p.411]) The secrecy capacity
of the wiretap channel W equals
Cs = max[I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)], (4)
where the maximum is computed over all RVs V,X, Y, Z such
that the Markov condition V → X → Y, Z holds true, and
such that PY |X = W1, PZ|X = W2.
While most general constructive coding schemes for the
wiretap channels rely on polar codes, there were some con-
structive solutions even before the publication of Arıkan’s
seminal work [2]. At the same time, these schemes applied
only to some special cases of the channels W1,W2. For
instance the case when W1 is noiseless and W2 is a binary
erasure channel was addressed in [23], [25] which show that
in this case the capacity Cs can be achieved using low-density
parity-check codes. The results in [25] are based on the weak
security assumption while strong security is considered in [23].
Moreover, [25] extends the construction to the cases when both
W1 and W2 are erasure channels, and when W1 is noiseless
and W2 is a binary symmetric channel.
Another special case of the wiretap channel relates to the
combinatorial version of the erasure channel (the so-called
wiretap channel of type II) in which Receiver 2 can choose
to observe any t symbols out of N transmitted symbols.
Constructive capacity-achieving solutions for this case are
based on MDS codes [26] or extractors [6].
In [5], it is shown that Cs is achievable with strong security
using invertible extractors, if both W1 and W2 are binary
symmetric channels. Both encoding and decoding algorithms
in [5] have polynomial complexity. Moreover, [5] also claims
that its proof method can be easily extended to other wiretap
channels as long as both W1 and W2 are symmetric.
After the introduction of polar codes by Arıkan, achieving
Cs via polar coding has been considered by different works,
mostly under the degradedness assumption. Recall that a
channel W2 : X → Z is called degraded with respect to a
channel W1 : X → Y if there exists a stochastic |Y| × |Z|
matrix PZ|Y (z|y) such that for all x ∈ X, z ∈ Z
PZ|X(z|x) =
∑
y∈Y
PY |X(y|x)PZ|Y (z|y). (5)
The wiretap channel W is called degraded if the channel
to the eavesdropper is degraded with respect to the main
channel. In this case Theorem 1 affords a simpler formulation
because there is no need in the auxiliary RV V . Namely, in
the degraded case the secrecy capacity equals [10, Probl. 17.8]
Cs = C(W1)− C(W2) (6)
(this specialization is true under more general assumptions,
but we will not need them below).
Communication over degraded wiretap channels using polar
codes was considered in a number of papers, notably, [16],
[11], [1], [15]. The main result of these works is that secrecy
capacity (6) can be attained under the weak security constraint.
We note that the degraded case is easier to handle with
polar codes because of the specific nature of the polar codes
construction (more on this below in Sec. III). Another step
was made by [22] which suggested a polar coding scheme that
attains the rate Cs of a symmetric degraded wiretap channel W
under the strong security requirement (2). More details about
the results of [22] are given in Sec. III below.
The problem of attaining secrecy capacity of the general
wiretap channel (4) under the strong secrecy condition and
without the degradedness assumption was further studied in
[24]. The coding scheme employed in [24] relies on two nested
layers of the polarizing transform. The decoder for the second
(outer) layer works with the probability distribution generated
by the first decoder, which is not easily computable. Thus, the
low complexity decoding claim of the construction made in
[24] is not supported by the known decoding procedures for
polar codes. For these reasons the construction in [24] does not
resolve the question of constructing a capacity-achieving polar
coding scheme for the nondegraded case of wiretap channels.
In related works [28], [20] the problem of constructing ca-
pacity achieving schemes for wiretap channels was addressed
for the case of quantum channels. The constructions suggested
in these works attain symmetric secrecy capacity of quantum
wiretap channels. These constructions require a shared secret
key between the transmitter and Receiver 1. This requirement
seems to be intrinsic to polar code constructions for this
problem including our work. However the constructions in
[28], [20] require a positive-rate shared key, whereas the bit
partition introduced by our encoding setup makes it possible
to have a vanishing rate shared key, as explained in Sec. IV.
To summarize, to the best of our knowledge the question of
constructing capacity-achieving polar coding schemes for the
non-degraded wiretap channel with strong secrecy is an open
problem.1
It is this problem that we aim to solve in this paper by
removing the degradedness assumption (5). We also do not
assume that either of the channels W1,W2 is symmetric.
The main idea of our work is to exploit the Markov chain
conditions intrinsic to secure communication problems using
polar codes. In Sec. IV we propose a polar coding scheme
that attains the secrecy capacity (4) under the strong secu-
rity assumption. Both the encoding and decoding complexity
estimates of our construction are O(N logN), where N is
the length of the encoding. In Sec. V-B we generalize our
construction to cover the case when a part of transmitter’s
message is public, i.e., is designed to be conveyed both to
Receivers 1 and 2. This model, called a broadcast channel
1 A concurrent study [7], posted after the completion of this work, also
contains a solution of the problems considered in this paper, including the
general wiretap channel. The transmission scheme and the proof methods in
[7] are different from our work. Another recent paper, [27], also devoted to the
general wiretap channel, focuses on the weak security requirement. A more
detailed discussion of the relation of our work and [7] appears in Sec. VI.
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with confidential messages, is in fact the principal model in
the founding work of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [9] on this topic.
Apart from the basic polar coding results [2], our solution
of the described problems relies on the previous work on
the wiretap channel [22], the polar coding scheme for the
broadcast channel of [19], and the construction of polar
codes for general memoryless channels in [12]. A new idea
introduced in our solution is related to a stochastic encoding
scheme that emulates the random coding proof of the capacity
theorem in [9], whereby polarization is used for the values
of the auxiliary random variable V in Theorem 1, followed
by a stochastic encoding into a channel codeword. Another
insight, which is particularly useful for the broadcast channel
result in Sec. V, is related to a partition of the coordinates of
the transmitted block that enables simultaneous decoding of
different parts of the transmitted message by both receivers,
whereby the decoder of polar codes is used by the receivers
according to their high- and low-entropy bits. It becomes
possible to show that the receivers recover the bits designed
to communicate with each of them with high probability, and
that the secret part of the message is not accessible to the
unintended recipient.
II. PRELIMINARIES ON POLAR CODING
We begin with recalling basic notation for polar codes
and then continue with the scheme for capacity-achieving
communication on discrete binary-input channels.
Let W be a binary-input channel with the output alphabet
Y, input alphabet X = {0, 1}, and the conditional prob-
ability distribution WY |X(·|·), having capacity C(W ) :=
maxPX I(X;Y ). The symmetric capacity I(W ) is the value
of mutual information I(X;Y ) when PX(0) = PX(1) = 1/2.
We say that the channel W is symmetric if WY |X(y|1), y ∈
Y can be obtained from WY |X(y|0), y ∈ Y through a permu-
tation pi : Y→ Y such that pi2 = id. If W is symmetric, then
I(W ) = C(W ).
Given a binary RV X and a discrete RV Y supported on Y,
define the Bhattacharyya parameter Z(X|Y ) as
Z(X|Y ) = 2
∑
y∈Y
PY (y)
√
PX|Y (0|y)PX|Y (1|y).
The value Z(X|Y ), 0 ≤ Z(X|Y ) ≤ 1 measures the amount
of randomness in X given Y in the sense that if it is close to
zero, then X is almost constant given Y , while if it is close
to one, then X is almost uniform on {0, 1} given Y . The
Bhattacharyya parameter Z(W ) of a binary-input channel W
is defined as
Z(W ) =
∑
y∈Y
√
WY |X(y|0)WY |X(y|1).
Clearly if PX(0) = PX(1) = 1/2, then Z(X|Y ) coincides
with the value Z(W ) for the communication channel W :
X → Y.
For N = 2n and n ∈ N, define the polarizing matrix
(or the Arıkan transform matrix) as GN = BNF⊗n, where
F =
(
1 0
1 1
)
, ⊗ is the Kronecker product of matrices, and
BN is a “bit reversal” permutation matrix [2]. In [2], Arıkan
showed that given a symmetric and binary input channel W ,
an appropriate subset of the rows of GN can be used as a
generator matrix of a linear code that achieves the capacity of
W as N →∞.
A. Symmetric Channel Coding
The material in this section and Sec. II-B is well understood,
but it merits some space in the present paper because it helps
us to define the terminology that is useful for the main results
below. Given a symmetric binary-input channel W , define the
channel WN with input alphabet {0, 1}N and output alphabet
YN by the conditional distribution
WN (yN |xN ) =
N∏
i=1
W (yi|xi),
where W (.|.) is the conditional distribution that defines W .
Define a combined channel W˜ by the conditional distribution
W˜ (yN |uN ) = WN (yN |uNGN ).
In terms of W˜ , the channel seen by the i-th bit Ui, i =
1, . . . , N (also known as the bit-channel of the i-th bit) can
be written as
Wi(y
N , ui−1|ui) = 1
2n−1
∑
u˜∈{0,1}n−i
W˜ (yN |(ui−11 , ui, u˜)),
where ui−1 = (u1, u2, . . . , ui−1). We see that Wi is the
conditional distribution of (Y N , U i−1) given Ui provided
that the channel inputs Xi are uniformly distributed for all
i = 1, . . . , N . The bit-channels thus defined are partitioned
into good channels GN (W,β) and bad channels BN (W,β)
based on the value of their Bhattacharyya parameters. Bearing
in mind our notation choices later in the paper, we denote them
by
LX|Y = LX|Y (N) = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Wi) ≤ δN}
HX|Y = HX|Y (N) = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Wi) > 1− δN},
(7)
respectively, where [N ] = {1, 2, . . . , N} and δN , 2−Nβ , β ∈
(0, 1/2). As shown in [4], [14], for any symmetric binary-input
channel W and any constant β < 1/2,
lim
N→∞
|LX|Y (N)|
N
= C(W )
lim
N→∞
|HX|Y (N)|
N
= 1− C(W ).
(8)
Based on this equality, information can be transmitted over
the good-bit channels while the remaining bits are fixed to
some values known in advance to the receiver (in polar coding
literature they are called frozen bits). The transmission scheme
can be described as follows: A message of k = |LX|Y | bits
is written in the bits ui, i ∈ LX|Y . The remaining N − k bits
of uN are set to 0. This determines the sequence uN which
is transformed into xN = uNGN , and the vector xN is sent
over the channel. Denote by yN the sequence received on the
output. The decoder finds an estimate of uN by computing the
values uˆi, i = 1, . . . , N as follows:
uˆi =
{
argmaxu∈{0,1}Wi(y
N , uˆi−1|u), if i ∈ LX|Y ,
0, if i ∈ HX|Y .
(9)
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The results of [2], [4] imply the following upper bound on the
error probability Pe = Pr(uˆN 6= uN ) :
Pe ≤
∑
i∈LX|Y
Z(Wi) ≤ N2−Nβ ≤ 2−Nβ
′
, (10)
where β is any number in the interval (0, 0.5) and β′ =
β′(N) < β.
This describes the basic construction of polar codes [2]
which attains symmetric capacity I(W ) of the channel W
with asymptotically vanishing error rate.
Remark II.1. There is a subtle point about the limit relations
in (8). Even though asymptotically the bit channels are either
good or bad, it is not true that LcX|Y = HX|Y because there
is a nonempty subset of indices LcX|Y \HX|Y of cardinality
o(N) that is neither good nor bad. This distinction has no
import for the simple situation of transmitting over W , but
leads to complications in the multi-user systems considered
below; see, e.g., (18) in Sec. IV.
B. General Channel Coding
Let W be a binary-input discrete memoryless channel
W : X→ Y and let PX be the capacity achieving distribution
of W . If PX is not uniform, then the basic scheme attains
a transmission rate I(W ) which is less than C(W ). This
scheme was extended by Honda and Yamamoto [12] to cover
the case of arbitrary distributions PX , attaining the rate C(W )
for general binary-input channels.
To explain the idea in [12], for a given block length N
define the sets
HX = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ui|U i−1) ≥ 1− δN}
LX = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ui|U i−1) ≤ δN}
HX|Y = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ui|U i−1, Y N ) ≥ 1− δN}
LX|Y = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ui|U i−1, Y N ) ≤ δN}
(11)
where UN , XN , Y N have the same meaning as above. It can
be shown [12, Theorem 1] that
lim
N→∞
1
N
|HX | = H(X)
lim
N→∞
1
N
|HX|Y | = H(X|Y ).
Two special cases of these relations were proved earlier, see
[14, Theorem 19] for uniform UN and [4] for a fixed (small)
value of δ.
We note that the set LX|Y is the set of good bit channels
defined in (7). Unlike the case of uniform PX , it is not possible
to use all of these channels to transmit information over W.
This is because if i /∈ HX , then Ui cannot be used to carry
information conditioned on previous bits U i−1. Hence [12]
argued that the set of information indices should be chosen as
I , HX ∩ LX|Y rather than LX|Y .
Since HX|Y ⊆ HX and the number of indices that are
neither in HX|Y nor in LX|Y is o(N), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
|I| = lim
N→∞
1
N
(|HX | − |HX|Y |) = C(W ),
i.e., transmitting the information using the bits Ui, i ∈ I attains
the capacity of the channel W.
The code construction in [12] makes use of the following
partition of the coordinate set [N ]:
Fr = HX ∩ LcX|Y
Fd = H
c
X
I = HX ∩ LX|Y
 (12)
where the superscript c refers to the complement of the subset
in [N ]. In terms of this partition, the encoding is done as
follows. The information bits are stored in {ui, i ∈ I}. As
for the bits in the subset {i ∈ Fr ∪ Fd}, [12] suggested to
sample their values from the distribtion PUi|Ui−1 . These values
are shared with the receiver similarly to the “frozen bits” of
the symmetric scheme of [2]. Once uN is determined, the
transmitter finds xN = uNGN and sends it over the channel.
The receiver uses the following successive decoding func-
tion: for i = 1, 2, . . . , N let
uˆi =
{
argmaxu∈{0,1}PUi|Ui−1,Y N (u|uˆi−1, yN ), i ∈ I
ui, i ∈ Fr ∪ Fd.
(13)
Note that this rule represents a MAP decoder for the ith
subchannel, which for the symmetric case coincides with the
ML decoder rule (9).
The probability of decoding error can be bounded above
similarly to (10):
Pe ≤
∑
i∈I
Z(Ui|U i−1, Y N ) ≤ N2−Nβ ≤ 2−Nβ
′
(14)
where the parameters have the same meaning as before.
Moreover, [12] argues that there exists a set of deterministic
maps λi : {0, 1}i−1 → {0, 1}, i ∈ Fr∪Fd such that (14) holds
true, stating the decoding rule in the form
uˆi =
{
argmaxu∈{0,1}PUi|Ui−1,Y N (u|uˆi−1, yN ), i ∈ I
λi(uˆ
i−1), i ∈ Fr ∪ Fd.
(15)
The mappings λi are shared between the transmitter and the
receiver prior to communication. We shall use this form of the
transmission scheme and the decoder throughout our paper.
This completes the description of the capacity-achieving
transmission scheme of [12]. We will rely in part on these
ideas in our construction of a coding scheme for the wiretap
channel.
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT PRIOR WORKS ON POLAR
CODING FOR THE WIRETAP CHANNEL
To explain our proposal we will first discuss some of
the schemes available in the literature. We begin with the
transmission scheme of [16] (see also [1], [15], [11]). As
already remarked, these works are concerned with the special
case when the channel W2 is degraded with respect to W1
and aim to attain the rate value (6) with weak secrecy. Let
XN be a random uniform vector over {0, 1}N . Similarly to
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bit channels good for both
Receiver 1 and Receiver 2
bit channels good for Receiver 1
but bad for Receiver 2
bit channels bad for both
Receiver 1 and Receiver 2
b
b
b
b
X1
X2
XN
random bits
information bits
frozen bits
I = LX|Y \LX|Z
R = LX|Z
B = LcX|Y
Arıkan TransformGN
Fig. 1. Block diagram of the coding scheme in [16]. Good bit channels and
bad bit channels are as defined by (7).
HX|Y and LX|Y given by (11), define the following subsets
of indices:
HX|Z = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ui|U i−1, ZN ) ≥ 1− δN}
LX|Z = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ui|U i−1, ZN ) ≤ δN}
where UN = XNGN , and ZN is the output that Receiver 2
observes when the transmitter sends XN . Partition the set [N ]
as follows:
R = LX|Z
I = LX|Y \LX|Z
B = LcX|Y .
(16)
Note that the degradedness assumption (5) implies the in-
clusion LX|Z ⊆ LX|Y . The coding scheme for the wiretap
channel relies on the partition (16) and is summarized in
Figure 1. The information is stored in the bits ui, i ∈ I.
The bits in the coordinates in R are chosen randomly while
the bits in B form a subset of the frozen bits.
Attainability of the rate (6) using this coding scheme is
proved in the cited papers. An essential remark here is that
the bits ui, i ∈ R are randomly selected because fixing their
values contradicts even the weak security constraint, let alone
the stronger one.
We note that generally HcX|Z 6⊂ LX|Y , and even though the
number of coordinates in LcX|Y ∩HcX|Z behaves as o(N), this
constitutes an obstacle to achieving strong security. To bypass
it, [22] uses a different partition of the coordinates, namely
I˜ = LX|Y ∩HX|Z
B˜ = LcX|Y ∩HX|Z
R˜1 = LX|Y ∩HcX|Z
R˜2 = L
c
X|Y ∩HcX|Z .
(17)
Apart from transmitting the information, the coding scheme
aims to convey the bits in R˜2 to Receiver 1 using the good
indices of Receiver 1, at the same time preserving the security
requirement. This is accomplished using the “chaining” con-
struction proposed in [22]2 and shown in Fig. 2. As the figure
suggests, the bits in R˜2(j) contained in block j are transmitted
over the channel as a part of the message of block j − 1, for
2The term “chaining” was introduced later in [19].
I˜\E˜
E˜
R˜1
R˜2
B˜
b b b
Block 1 Block 2 Blockm
b b b
information
bits
random
bits
frozen
bits
random
bits
I˜\E˜
E˜
R˜1
R˜2
B˜
I˜\E˜
E˜
R˜1
R˜2
B˜
seed
Fig. 2. Block diagram of the coding scheme in [22].
all j = 2, . . . ,m. This enables Receiver 1 to recover these
bits reliably as a part of the successive decoding procedure
for block j, which is performed similarly to (13). At the same
time, because of the inclusion I˜ ⊂ HX|Z , Receiver 2 does not
have the resources for their reliable decoding, which provides
the desired security.
The analysis of the transmission is performed based on m
blocks of N bits as opposed to a single block. The seed for
the transmission is provided by choosing |R˜2| = o(N) random
bits which are shared with Receiver 1 (more on this below).
In each of the blocks 1 to m, the bits indexed by the set I˜\E˜
are used to send the message. Here E˜ is an arbitrary subset of
the set I˜ of size R˜2 whose role is explained below.
The bits in R˜1 are selected randomly, and the bits ui, i ∈ B˜
are frozen, i.e., assigned arbitrarily and shared in advance with
Receiver 1 (they may be also known to Receiver 2 without
compromising secrecy).
The assignment of bits in the set R˜2 in block j depends
on the block index. In block 1 these bits are set equal to the
message bits of the seed block. In block j = 2, . . . ,m the bits
indexed by the set R˜2 are set to be equal to the bits in the set
E˜ in block j − 1, representing the chaining procedure.
Having formed the sequence uN (j) in block j = 1, . . . ,m,
the encoder passes it through the polarizing transform and
transmits the sequence xN = uNGN over the channel. The
only remaining problem is to convey to Receiver 1 the bits
of R˜2 of the first block. This is done by performing the seed
transmission of a block which encodes the |R˜2| bits using
some error correcting code of length N . As claimed in [22],
it is possible to choose such a code to fulfill the reliability and
security requirements because its rate can be made arbitrarily
close to zero. The fact that the seed code needs to encode
only a small number o(N) of message bits follows from the
degradedness assumption, which is therefore essential in this
construction.
As shown in [22], this scheme satisfies both constraints
(1) and (2) under the assumption that the channel to the
eavesdropper is degraded with respect to the channel W1. The
rate of communication between the transmitter and Receiver
1 can be made arbitrarily close to the value I(W1) − I(W2)
since the assumption that W2 is degraded with respect to W1
ensures that |R˜2| = o(N), i.e., there is no asymptotic loss in
rate by removing the bits {ui, i ∈ E˜} from the message in
order to support the strong security condition.
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IV. POLAR CODING FOR THE WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we show that secrecy capacity for the wiretap
channel given by Theorem 1 is achievable using polar codes.
For this purpose, we consider the RVs V,X, Y, Z as described
by Theorem 1, i.e., we assume some fixed distributions
PV , PX|V and the conditional distributions PY |X = W1,
PZ|X = W2 that satisfy the Markov condition V → X →
Y,Z and maximize the expression in (4). Define the RV
TN = V NGN , where V N denotes N independent realizations
of V . The transformation V N → TN induces conditional
distributions PTi|T i−1 derived from the corresponding distri-
butions of the RVs Vi. Define the sets HV , LV , HV |Y , LV |Y
as follows:
HV = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ti|T i−1) ≥ 1− δN}
LV = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ti|T i−1) ≤ δN}
HV |Y = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ti|T i−1, Y N ) ≥ 1− δN}
LV |Y = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ti|T i−1, Y N ) ≤ δN}
and define the sets HV |Z , LV |Z analogously. The cardinalities
of these sets satisfy 1N |HV | → H(V ), 1N |LV |Y | → 1 −
H(V |Y ), 1N |HV |Z | → H(V |Z) as N → ∞ [12, Theorem
1].
Define a partition of [N ] into the following sets which will
be used to describe the coding scheme3
I = HV ∩ LV |Y ∩HV |Z
B = HV ∩ LcV |Y ∩HV |Z
R1 = HV ∩ LV |Y ∩HcV |Z
R2 = HV ∩ LcV |Y ∩HcV |Z
D = HcV .
(18)
The partition of [N ] that thus arises is illustrated in Figure 3. It
will be seen that the subsets I, R1, R2, B in our coding scheme
play the role similar to that of the analogously denoted subsets
in (17). Importantly, the cardinality of R2 is not o(N) any
more, which requires adjustments in the transmission scheme.
Moreover, there is an extra randomness needed to determine
the sequence to be transmitted, as will be seen in the encoding
algorithm below.
Encoding: We build on the chaining idea of [22], con-
necting multiple blocks in a cluster whose performance in
transmission will attain the desired goals. The cluster consists
of a seed block and a number, m, of other blocks. The seed
block consists of |R2| random bits. Even though the cardinality
of the set R2 constitutes a nonvanishing proportion of [N ],
the rate of the seed |R2|/mN can be made arbitrarily small
by choosing m sufficiently large. (For example, one can set
m = Nα for some α > 0, and let N →∞.)
Let us describe the encoding and decoding procedures. The
transmission is accomplished using m blocks of length N each
and the seed block. Every block tN = tN (j), j = 1, . . . ,m
contains a group of almost deterministic bits, denoted by D
in Figure 4. The values of these bits are assigned according to
3We use the notation I,B in this section in the sense different from Sec. III.
Since both uses are localized to their respective sections, this should not cause
confusion.
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Fig. 3. Partition of N coordinates of the block for transmission over the
wiretap channel W; see (18). The highlighted part of the top block represents
high-entropy coordinates for the distribution PV . Similarly, in the middle
block we highlight the high-entropy coordinates of the distribution PV |Z and
in the bottom block the low-entropy coordinates for the distribution PV |Y .
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Fig. 4. Block diagram of the wiretap coding scheme: Forming the blocks
tN (j), j = 1, . . . ,m.
a family of deterministic rules {λi, i ∈ D} described in (15).
The bits ti, i ∈ B in each of the m blocks are determined
similarly, based on {λi, i ∈ B}. These rules are chosen the
same for each block, and are shared with Receiver 1. Even
if the rate (|B| + |D|)/mN can be made arbitrarily small
similarly to |R2|/mN , it may be the case that such a rule
sharing requires a positive rate of secure communication. As
a remedy to this problem, the bits ti, i ∈ B can be chosen
randomly and be the same for each block, and shared with
Receiver 1 secretly. This pre-shared randomness still allows
one to maintain secrecy as shown by the results presented
below. We note that [7] also relies on the same assumption
for their proof of the secrecy condition.
The remaining subsets of coordinates are filled as follows.
For block 1, the bits in the set R2 are assigned the value of
the bits of the seed block, while for blocks j = 2, . . . ,m these
bits are set to be equal to the bits in E(j − 1) of block j − 1.
Here, E is a subset of I having the same size as R2. The
messages are stored in the bits indexed by I\E. The randomly
chosen bits in E are written in the coordinates that are good
for Receiver 1 and contained in the bad (high-entropy) set
of Receiver 2. These bits are transmitted to Receiver 1 in
block j and used for the decoding of the message contained
in block j + 1, for all j = 1, 2, . . . ,m − 1. Finally, the
bits in R1 are assigned randomly and uniformly for each
of the m blocks. The diagram of the chaining construction
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for encoding is given in Figure 4. Let E(0) be the message
sequence encoded in the seed block, let E(j), j = 1, . . . ,m be
the corresponding sequences in the other blocks (see Fig. 4),
and let r(j), j = 1, . . . ,m the randomly chosen bits in each
block. The encoding proceeds as follows: In Block 1 we put
ti =

λi(t
i−1(1)) if i ∈ B ∪D
Ei(0) if i ∈ R2
ri(1) if i ∈ I ∪ R1
(19)
and in blocks j = 2, . . . ,m we put
ti =

λi(t
i−1(j)) if i ∈ B ∪D
Ei(j − 1) if i ∈ R2
ri(j) if i ∈ I ∪R1,
(20)
where the family of mappings λi is chosen from the ensem-
ble PΛi [Λi(t
i−1) = 1] = PTi|T i−1(1|ti−1) for all ti−1 ∈
{0, 1}i−1.
Once the blocks tN (j), j = 1, 2, . . . ,m are formed, we
find m sequences vN (j) = tN (j)GN by using the polarizing
transform. Finally, given vN , the codeword to be sent over
the wiretap channel will be chosen as xN with probability
PXN |V N (xN |vN ) =
∏N
i=1 PX|V (xi|vi), where PX|V is the
conditional distribution induced by the joint distribution of
the RVs V and X . This logic is suggested by the proof
of the capacity theorem, Theorem 1, which first considers
“transmitting” the RV V N to the receivers, and then choosing
XN so as to satisfy the Markov chain condition in the
statement.
Decoding:
Let yN (1), . . . , yN (m) be the sequences that Receiver 1
observes on the output of the channel W1. The decoding rule
is as follows:
tˆi =

λi(tˆ
i−1), if i ∈ B ∪D
argmaxt∈{0,1}PTi|T i−1Y N (t|tˆi−1, yN ), if i ∈ I ∪ R1
Ei(j − 1), if i ∈ R2
(21)
where PTi|T i−1 and PTi|T i−1,Y N are the conditional distribu-
tions induced by the joint distribution of the RVs V N and Y N
(this rule is applied to each of the blocks j = 1, . . . ,m, and
j is mostly omitted from the notation).
Let us show that the described scheme attains the secrecy
capacity of W. Namely, the following is true.
Theorem 2. For any γ > 0,  > 0 and N →∞ it is possible
to choose m so that the transmission scheme described above
attains the transmission rate R that is within γ of the secrecy
capacity of W (4) and the information leaked to Receiver 2
satisfies the strong secrecy condition (2).
Proof. Throughout the proof we assume that the RVs
V,X, Y, Z are as given in Theorem 1 and denote by PV XY Z
their joint distribution. The distribution PV NXNY NZN =∏N
i=1 PV XY Z(vi, xi, yi, zi) refers to N independent repeti-
tions of the RVs.
The rate of the proposed coding scheme is
m(|I| − |E|)
mN + |R2| =
(|HV ∩ LV |Y | − |HV ∩HcV |Z |)
N + |R2|/m ,
which approaches I(V ;Y ) − I(V ;Z) as N,m → ∞, where
the term |R2| in the denominator is due to the shared seed for
block 1. According to Theorem 1, this is the target rate that we
want to achieve for given V and X satisfying V → X → Y,Z
and PY |X = W1, PZ|X = W2.
Now let us prove the reliability and security condi-
tions. Let us introduce the following RVs: Let Mm =
(M1,M2, . . . ,Mm) correspond to the sequence of message
bits {ti, i ∈ I\E} transmitted in blocks 1, . . . ,m, and let
Zm = (ZN (1), . . . , ZN (m)) be a sequence of observations
of Receiver 2 as a result of the transmission of the m blocks.
Further, let Ej correspond to the bits contained in the subset
E(j), j = 1, . . . ,m.
Reliability: The claim of low error probability for Receiver
1 follows from the results of [12]. Since our communication
scheme is more complicated compared to [12], we give some
additional details.
Since we know the distribution PV N , we can compute the
distributions PTi|T i−1 , i = 1, . . . , N. Now assume that the
assignments of the bits indexed by B and D are done randomly
by sampling from the distribution PTi|T i−1 , for each of the
blocks 1, . . . ,m. Let QV NXNY NZN be the joint distribution
of the correspoding sequences arising from this assignment.
Denote by ‖·‖ the l1 distance between the distributions. From
the proof of Lemma 1 in [12] it follows that
‖PV NXNY NZN −QV NXNY NZN ‖ ≤ N2−N
β
(22)
holds for all the m blocks of transmission. Moreover, since
the message bits are entirely contained in the set of good bits
for channel W1, the probability of error is bounded by
‖PV NXNY N −QV NXNY N ‖+
∑
i∈I
Z(Ti|T i−1, Y N )
≤ 2N2−Nβ
for each individual block (see [12], Eqns (59)-(60)). Therefore,
there exists a family of deterministic rules {λi, i ∈ B∪D} such
that the overall error probability for the successive decoding
procedure (21) is at most 2mN2−N
β
, β ∈ (0, 1/2). We
conclude that the probability that Receiver 1 decodes the
information bits correctly approaches 1 as N tends to infinity.
Security: We will show that condition (2) is fulfilled for the
sequence of m blocks of transmission. For that purpose, we
will first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let A ⊂ I be a subset of coordinates, and let let
T [A] = {ti, i ∈ A} and T [I\A] = {ti, i ∈ I\A}. Then
I(T [I\A];T [A], ZN ) = O(N32−Nβ ). (23)
Proof. By definition in (18) we have the inclusion I ⊆ HV |Z .
Let us label the indices in I as a1, a2, . . . , a|I|, and assume
that a1 < a2 < · · · < a|I|. Using the inequality Z(X|Y )2 ≤
H(X|Y ) [3], we obtain the estimate
HP (Tai |T ai−1, ZN ) , HP (Tai |T1, . . . , Tai−1, ZN )
≥ 1− 2δN = 1− 2−Nβ+1 (24)
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for all i = 1, 2, . . . , |I|, where HP refers to the entropy under
the distribution PV NXNZN . Our aim is to find an estimate
on the mutual information in (23) under the distribution Q.
To find an upper bound for the entropy H(Tai |T ai−1 ZN )
(computed under Q), we use a standard estimate (e.g., [8,
Theorem 17.3.3]), and write
|H(Tai |T ai−1, ZN )−HP (Tai |T ai−1, ZN )|
≤ −‖PV NXNZN −QV NXNZN ‖
× log ‖PV NXNZN −QV NXNZN ‖|Z|N2N
where |Z| refers to the alphabet size for a single observation
of the eavesdropper. Then, we get from (22) and (24) that
H(Tai |T ai−1, ZN ) ≥ 1−O(N22−N
β
)−O(N (β+1)2−Nβ )
= 1−O(N22−Nβ ). (25)
Observe that (25) implies
H(Tai |Ta1 , Ta2 , . . . , Tai−1 , ZN ) ≥ H(Tai |T ai−1, ZN )
≥ 1−O(N22−Nβ ) (26)
for all i ∈ I.
Then we obtain
H(T [I\A] |T [A], ZN ) = H(T [I] |ZN )−H(T [A] |ZN )
≥ H(T [I]|ZN )− |A|
=
|I|∑
i=1
H(Tai |Ta1 , Ta2 , . . . , Tai−1 , ZN )− |A|
≥ |I|(1−O(N22−Nβ ))− |A| (27)
≥ |I\A| −O(N32−Nβ )
where (27) is due to (26). This completes the proof of (23).
Lemma 4. Let M j , (M1,M2, . . . ,Mj) and Zj ,
(Z1, Z2, . . . , Zj). For all j = 1, . . . ,m, we have
I(Ej ;M
j , Zj) = O(jN32−N
β
).
Proof. The proof is by induction on j. The base case j = 1
follows from Lemma 3. Now assume that the claim of the
lemma is true for j = k − 1 and write
I(Ek;M
k, Zk) = I(Ek;Mk, Zk)
+ I(Ek;M
k−1, Zk−1|Mk, Zk).
Using the chaining structure shown in Figure 4 we argue that
the only part of the transmission that connects block k− 1 to
block k is given by Ek−1. This implies that, conditional on
(Mk, Zk), we have a Markov chain Mk−1Zk−1 → Ek−1 →
Ek, so
I(Ek;M
k−1, Zk−1|Mk, Zk)
≤ I(Ek−1;Mk−1, Zk−1|Mk, Zk)
≤ I(Ek−1;Mk−1, Zk−1),
where the second inequality is due to the Markov chain
Mk−1Zk−1 → Ek−1 →MkZk. Therefore,
I(Ek;M
k, Zk) ≤ I(Ek;Mk, Zk) + I(Ek−1;Mk−1, Zk−1)
= O(N32−N
β
) +O((k − 1)N32−Nβ ) (28)
= O(kN32−N
β
).
Here (28) is due to Lemma 3 and the induction hypothesis.
This completes the proof.
Now we are ready to complete the proof of the strong
security condition. For this purpose, consider the following
sequence of inequalities:
I(Mm;Zm) ≤ I(Mm;Zm, Em)
= I(Mm−1;Zm, Em) + I(Mm;Zm, Em|Mm−1)
≤ I(Mm−1;Zm−1, Em−1) + I(Mm;Zm, Em|Mm−1)
(29)
≤ I(Mm−1;Zm−1, Em−1) + I(Mm;ZmEm,Mm−1)
= I(Mm−1;Zm−1, Em−1) + I(Mm;Em, Zm)
+ I(Mm;M
m−1, Zm−1|Em, Zm)
≤ I(Mm−1;Zm−1, Em−1) + I(Mm;Em, Zm)
+ I(Em−1;Mm−1, Zm−1) (30)
= I(Mm−1;Zm−1, Em−1) +O(N32−N
β
)
+O((m− 1)N32−Nβ ) (31)
= I(Mm−1;Zm−1Em−1) +O(mN32−N
β
), (32)
where (29) and (30) are implied by the chaining structure in
Figure 4, and (31) is due to Lemmas 3 and 4. From (32), we
have
I(Mm;Zm, Em) ≤ I(Mm−1;Zm−1, Em−1)
+O(mN32−N
β
)
which implies
I(Mm;Zm) ≤ I(Mm;ZmEm) = O(m2N32−Nβ ).
Then, recalling that m = Nα, α > 0 is sufficient to
satisfy the rate constraint, we observe that I(Mm; Zm) =
O(N3+2α 2−N
β
)→ 0 as N →∞, as required.
We conclude that a secrecy rate of I(V ;Y ) − I(V ;Z) is
achievable for any V such that V → X → Y,Z holds.
Therefore, the secrecy capacity Cs given by (4) is also
achievable.
V. POLAR CODING FOR BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH
CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
In this section we observe that ideas of the previous section
together with some earlier works enable us to extend our
code construction to a more general communication model
introduced in [9].
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A. The Model
Consider a pair of discrete memoryless channels with one
transmitter X and two receivers Y,Z. As before, let W1 :
X → Y and W2 : X → Z denote the channels and let X and
Y,Z denote the input alphabet and the output alphabets. We
assume that the system transmits three types of messages:
(i) a message s1 ∈ S1 from X to Y for which there are no
secrecy requirements;
(ii) a message s2 ∈ S2 from X to Y which is secret from
Z;
(iii) a message t ∈ T from X to Y and Z, called the
“common message”.
Following [9], we call this communication scheme a broadcast
channel with confidential messages (BCC).
As before, a block encoder for the BCC is a mapping
f : S1 × S2 × T → XN . A stochastic version of the encoder
is a probability matrix f(xN |s1, s2, t) with columns indexed
by xN ∈ XN and rows indexed by the triples (s1, s2, t).
Given such a triple, the stochastic encoder samples from the
conditional probability distribution on XN . In accordance with
the problem statement, there are two decoders: The decoder
of Receiver 1 is defined by a mapping φ : YN → S1× S2×T
and the decoder of Receiver 2 is a mapping ψ : ZN → T.
Denote the rate of the common message t by R0, and denote
the rates of the secret and non-secret messages to Y by Rs
and R1, respectively. The analogs of Definitions I.1, I.2 in this
case look as follows.
Definition V.1. The encoder-decoder mappings (f, φ, ψ) give
rise to (N, )- transmission over the BCC if for every s1 ∈ S1,
s2 ∈ S2, t ∈ T, decoder φ outputs the transmitted triple
(s1, s2, t) and decoder ψ outputs the message t with prob-
ability greater than 1− , i.e.,∑
xN∈XN
f(xN |s1, s2, t)PY N |XN (φ(yN ) = (s1, s2, t)|xN )
≥ 1− ,∑
xN∈XN
f(xN |s1, s2, t)PZN |XN (ψ(zN ) = t|xN ) ≥ 1− .
Definition V.2. (R1, Rs, R0) is an achievable rate triple for the
BCC if there exists a sequence of message sets S1,N , S2,N ,
TN and encoder-decoder triples (fN , φN , ψN ) giving rise to
(N, N ) transmission with N → 0, such that
lim
N→∞
1
N
log |S1,N | = R1
lim
N→∞
1
N
log |S2,N | = Rs
lim
N→∞
1
N
log |TN | = R0
lim
N→∞
I(S2,N ;Z
N ) = 0.
(33)
where S2,N is the random variable that corresponds to the
secret message.
Note that our definition takes into account the formulation
in [10] and is slightly different from the one in [9] (where we
write (R1, Rs, R0), [9] has (R1 +Rs, Rs, R0) ).
The following theorem gives the achievable rate region for
the triple (R1, Rs, R0).
Theorem 5. [9],[10, p. 414] The capacity region of the BCC
consists of those triples of nonnegative numbers (R1, Rs, R0)
that satisfy, for some RVs U → V → X → Y,Z with PY |X =
W1 and PZ|X = W2, the inequalities
R0 ≤ min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)] (34)
Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U) (35)
R0 +R1 +Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |U) + min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)].
(36)
Moreover, it may be assumed that V = (U, V ′) and the range
sizes of U and V ′ are at most |X|+ 3 and |X|+ 1.
One can define the secrecy capacity Cs in terms of the
capacity region of the BCC, and then recover Theorem 1 as a
particular case of Theorem 5.
B. Polar Coding for the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner Region
In this section, we aim to show that the capacity region of
the BCC can be achieved using polar codes. In the first two
steps we design a scheme that achieves the rate pairs (R0, Rs)
in (34)-(35), and in the last step we show that for any such
pair (R0, Rs) any rate value
R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |U) + min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)]−R0 −Rs (37)
is also achievable. Finally, the security condition in (33) will
be shown in Proposition 6 below.
The overall encoding scheme is stochastic and assumes
some fixed joint distribution of the RVs U, V,X, Y, Z such
that the constraints of Theorem 5 are satisfied. Since the results
below are valid for any such distribution, this will enable us
to claim achievability of the rate region in this theorem. The
encoder is formed of two stages performed in succession. At
the outcome of the first stage, which deals with the common
message s2, the encoder computes a sequence of m blocks of
N bits denoted below by qN (j), j = 1, . . . ,m. These blocks
are used in the second stage to construct the data encoding
that is going to be sent to both receivers. Namely, it will be
seen that the transformed blocks uN = qNGN can at the
same time encode the common message to both receivers and
also encode side information for Receiver 1 to ensure reliable
transmission of the confidential message. The actual sequences
to be transmitted are computed in the second stage based
on the sequences uN (j). This is done by first constructing
sequences tN (j) using the ideas developed in Sec. IV and
by using a stochastic mapping of these sequences on the
condewords xN (j). Upon transmitting, these codewords are
received by Receiver 1 as yN (j) and by Receiver 2 as zN (j).
We will argue that the receivers can independently perform
decoding procedures that recover the three desired types of
messages reliably (and when appropriate, also securely).
1) The common-message encoding: The proof of the fact
that any R0 satisfying (34) is achievable follows from the
polar coding scheme for the superposition region given in [19].
Given the RVs U → V → X → Y,Z with PY |X = W1 and
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PZ|X = W2, let UN , V N , XN , Y N , ZN be N independent
repetitions of the RVs U, V,X, Y, Z. Set
QN = UNGN , (38)
where GN is Arıkan’s transform. As before, lowercase letters
denote realizations of these RVs.
Define the sets HU , LU |Y , LU |Z as follows:
HU = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Qi|Qi−1) ≥ 1− δN}
LU |Y = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Qi|Qi−1, Y N ) ≤ δN}
LU |Z = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Qi|Qi−1, ZN ) ≤ δN}.
The cardinalities of these sets, normalized by N , approach
respectively H(U), 1−H(U |Y ), 1−H(U |Z) as N →∞.
Now observe that for Receiver 1 to recover qN correctly,
the indices of the information bits should be a subset of I(1)u =
HU ∩LU |Y . Similarly, for Receiver 2 to recover the sequence
qN correctly, the information bits should be placed only in
those positions of qN that are indexed by the set I(2)u = HU ∩
LU |Z . Therefore, choosing the indices of information bits as
Iu = I
(1)
u ∩ I(2)u ensures that the message embedded into qN
will be decoded correctly by both receivers. In this case, the
rate of the common message is R0 = |I(1)u ∩ I(2)u |/N . Given
that
lim
N→∞
1
N
|I(1)u | = I(U ;Y )
lim
N→∞
1
N
|I(2)u | = I(U ;Z)
we conclude the common message rate R0 attains the value
min[I(U ;Y ); I(U ;Z)] only if either I(2)u ⊆ I(1)u or I(1)u ⊆ I(2)u
holds starting from some N . However, generally this does not
have to be the case. To overcome this problem, [19] proposed
the following coding scheme. Define the sets
D(1) = I(1)u \I(2)u
D(2) = I(2)u \I(1)u .
Without loss of generality, assume that I(U ;Y ) ≤ I(U ;Z),
which implies that |D(2)| ≥ |D(1)| starting with some N .
To describe the encoding procedure, consider m blocks of N
coordinates each. In block 1, we use the positions indexed
by D(1) to store message bits and assign the bits indexed by
D(2) to some fixed values that are available to Receiver 1. In
Block j, j = 2, . . . ,m−1, we again use the positions indexed
by D(1) to store message bits and copy the part of Block
j − 1 indexed by the coordinates in D(1) into the positions
indexed by a subset of coordinates E(2) ⊂ D(2) in block j
(thus |E(2)| = |D(1)|). Fill the remaining |D(2)\E(2)| bits in
each block j ∈ {2, . . . ,m− 1} with random and independent
bits and communicate them to Receiver 1. These bits can be
the same for each block as long as they are independent and
uniform within the same block, so this part of the scheme has
negligible impact on the overall rate. In the final block m, we
assign the bits indexed by D(1) to some fixed values that are
available to Receiver 2 and copy the bits in D(1)(m−1) to the
positions in E(2)(m). The remaining |D(2)\E(2)| coordinates
in block m are filled with random bit values. The bits in HU ∩
(I
(1)
u ∪ I(2)u )c and HcU are chosen based on deterministic rules
λi similarly to Sec. IV. These bits are the same for each block
and are shared with both receivers. The block diagram of the
described coding scheme is shown by Figure 5.
The encoding stage described passes the sequences
uN (j), j = 1, . . . ,m to the second stage which is responsible
for actual communication. Upon observing the channel out-
puts, both receivers perform decoding, which will be described
below in Sec. V-B3.
2) The secret-message encoding: In this section we de-
scribe the construction of sequences xN that are sent by
transmitter X. The construction relies on the sequences uN (j)
constructed by X in the first stage. These sequences can be
thought of as side information that enables Receiver 1 to
reconstruct the secret message.
The transmission scheme we propose to achieve the rate Rs
that satisfies (35), is very similar to the scheme described for
the wiretap channel problem in Sec. IV. Our solution consists
of choosing the indices of information bits and random bits
appropriately and using a chaining scheme quite similar to the
one shown in Figure 4.
Let UN , V N , XN , Y N , ZN be as defined in Sec. V-B1, and
let TN = V NGN . Viewing U as side information about V ,
we define the sets
HV |U = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ti|T i−1, UN ) ≥ 1− δN}
LV |U,Y = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ti|T i−1, UN , Y N ) ≤ δN}
HV |U,Z = {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ti|T i−1, UN , ZN ) ≥ 1− δN}
whose cardinalities, normalized by N, approach respectively
the values H(V |U), 1−H(V |U, Y ), H(V |U,Z) as N →∞.
The intuition behind the construction presented below can
be described as follows. First, note that the coordinates of TN
indexed by
J(1) = HV |U ∩ LV |U,Y (39)
can be decoded by Receiver 1, and so they can be used to send
more data in addition to the common message. Of these bits,
the part indexed by (HV |U ∩LV |U,Y )\(HV |U ∩HcV |U,Z) can
be used to transmit the confidential message. Then, given that
1
N |HV |U ∩LV |U,Y | → I(V ;Y |U) and 1N |HV |U ∩HcV |U,Z | →
I(V ;Z|U), we obtain
lim
N→∞
1
N
|(HV |U ∩ LV |U,Y )\(HV |U ∩HcV |U,Z)|
≥ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U).
This implies that the proposed scheme transmits the secret
message at rates arbitrarily close to the rate given by (35)
(provided that it also satisfies the strong security condition).
Building on this observation, we proceed to describe the
coding scheme, adding some details that make the secrecy
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. , NO. , 2016 11
Iu
D(2)
D(1)
HU ∩ (I(1)u ∪ I(2)u )c
HcU H
c
U
Iu
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Block 1 Block 2 b b b
b b b
Blockm
frozen
frozen
information
bits
frozen
bits
deterministic
bits
random bits
revealed to
Receiver 1
D(2)\E(2)
Iu
D(1)
HU ∩ (I(1)u ∪ I(2)u )c HU ∩ (I(1)u ∪ I(2)u )c
D(1)
E(2)
D(2)\E(2)
E(2)
Fig. 5. Encoding for the common-message case: The structure of the blocks qN (j), j = 1, . . . ,m
part work. Define the sets4
I = HV |U ∩ LV |U,Y ∩HV |U,Z
B = HV |U ∩ LcV |U,Y ∩HV |U,Z
R1 = HV |U ∩ LV |U,Y ∩HcV |U,Z
R2 = HV |U ∩ LcV |U,Y ∩HcV |U,Z
D = HcV |U .
(40)
Note that the sets I,R1,R2,B,D partition [N ]. This partition
is basically the same as in (18) (see also Figures 3 and IV)
except for the fact that the high- and low-entropy subsets rely
on entropy quantities that are additionally conditioned on U .
The transmission scheme that we propose is formed of
multiple blocks joined in clusters of m blocks. Similarly to the
wiretap coding scheme, there is a seed block shared between
the transmitter and Receiver 1. The seed block consists of |R2|
random bits. Even if the set R2 constitutes a nonvanishing
proportion of [N ], the rate of the seed |R2|/mN can be
made arbitrarily small by choosing m sufficiently large. (For
example, one can set m = Nα for some α > 0, and let N
tend to infinity.)
The encoding procedure is as follows. Our aim is to
construct m blocks tN (j) which will be used to form the
transmitted sequences xN (j), j = 1, . . . ,m. Apart from the
seed block, all the other blocks tN contain a group of
almost deterministic bits, denoted by D in (40). For block
j, j = 1, . . . ,m, the values of these bits are assigned according
to a deterministic rule λi (similarly to the earlier appearence
of this mapping, see, e.g., Sec. IV), namely
ti = λi(t
i−1, uN (j))
for all i ∈ D. The set of bits B in each of the m blocks
is chosen similarly based on a family of deterministic rules
{λi, i ∈ B}. These rules are chosen the same for each block,
and are shared with Receiver 1 (cf. also the remark on this in
Sec. IV).
The remaining subsets of coordinates in are filled as follows.
For block 1, the bits in the set R2 are assigned the values of
the bits of the seed block, while for block j, j = 2, . . . ,m
these bits are set to be equal to the bits in E of block j − 1.
4We again use the same notation as in (18); since the earlier notation is
used only in Sec. IV, this should not cause confusion.
Here, E is a subset of I having the same size as R2. The
messages are stored in the bits indexed by I\E which are
good for Receiver 1 and contained in the bad (high-entropy)
set of Receiver 2. The indices in the subset E are still good
for Receiver 1 but bad for Receiver 2. Nevertheless, they are
filled with random bits that are used for decoding by Receiver
1 in the same way as was done in Sec. IV. Finally, the bits
in R1 are assigned randomly and uniformly for each of the m
blocks. We once again refer to Fig. IV which illustrates the
described processing. Once the blocks tN (j), j = 1, . . . ,m
are formed, we compute m sequences vN (j) = tN (j)GN by
using the polarizing transform.
Finally, the codewords to be sent by the transmit-
ter are computed as follows. The codeword xN (j), j =
1, . . . ,m is sampled from XN according to the distribution
PXN |V N (xN |vN ) =
∏N
i=1 PX|V (xi|vi), where PX|V is the
conditional distribution induced by the joint distribution of
the RVs V and X .
3) Decoding of the common message and the secret mes-
sage: Assume that the transmitted sequence xN is received
as yN by Receiver 1 and as zN by Receiver 2. Importantly,
by our construction these sequences follow the conditional
distributions PY |X and PZ|X given by the channels W1 and
W2. We describe the decoding procedures by Receivers 1 and
2. Initially they perform similar operations aimed at recovering
the common message. Once this is accomplished, Receiver 1
performs additional decoding to recover the secret message.
We begin with the common-message part. In accordance
with (38), Receivers 1 and 2 decode the blocks qN (j), j =
1, . . . ,m relying on a iterative procedure. As the construction
suggests, Receiver 1 decodes in the forward direction, starting
with block 1 and ending with block m, and Receiver 2 decodes
backwards, starting with block m and ending with block 1. Let
D(j) = {qi, i ∈ D(1)(j)}, j = 1, . . . ,m− 1
C(j) = {qi, i ∈ E(2)(j)}, j = 2, . . . ,m
denote the subblocks D,E of the corresponding blocks (see
Fig. 5).
The processing by Receiver 1 is as follows. For block 1, it
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computes
qˆi =

qi if i ∈ D(2)
argmaxq∈{0,1}PQi|Qi−1Y N (q|qˆi−1, yN ),
if i ∈ Iu ∪D(1)
λi(qˆ
i−1) otherwise.
(41)
For the remaining blocks j = 2, . . . ,m Receiver 1 computes
the vector (qˆi(j), i = 1, . . . , N) as follows:
qˆi(j) =

Di(j − 1) if i ∈ E(2)
qi(j) if i ∈ D(2)\E(2)
argmaxq∈{0,1}PQi|Qi−1Y N (q|qˆi−1(j), yN (j)),
if i ∈ Iu ∪D(1)
λi(qˆ
i−1(j)) otherwise.
(42)
The processing by Receiver 2 is quite similar except that it
starts with block m and advances “backwards” for j = m −
1,m− 2, . . . , 1. For block m the rule is as follows:
qˆi =

qi if i ∈ D(1)
argmaxq∈{0,1}PQi|Qi−1ZN (q|qˆi−1, zN ),
if i ∈ Iu ∪D(2)
λi(qˆ
i−1) otherwise.
(43)
For blocks j = m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1, Receiver 2 computes its
estimates of the vector qN (j) as follows:
qˆi(j) =

Ci(j + 1) if i ∈ D(1)
argmaxq∈{0,1}PQi|Qi−1ZN (q|qˆi−1(j), zN (j)),
if i ∈ Iu ∪D(2)
λi(qˆ
i−1(j)) otherwise.
(44)
(in (41)-(44) the notation is somewhat abbreviated to keep the
formulas compact, e.g., no reference is made to the index of
the receiver, and the block index j is sometimes omitted).
The processing described above in (41)-(42) yields the
sequences uˆN (j) = qN (j)GN , j = 1, . . . ,m which are used
by Receiver 1 to recover the secret messages. Denote by E(0)
the message sequence encoded in the seed block, and let
E(j), j = 1, . . . ,m be the subblock of block j indexed by
the set E. For j = 1, . . . ,m, the decoding rule is as follows:
tˆi(j) =
λi(tˆ
i−1(j), uˆN (j)) if i ∈ D ∪B
argmaxt∈{0,1}PTi|T i−1UNY N (t|tˆi−1(j), uˆN (j), yN (j)),
if i ∈ I ∪ R1
Ei(j − 1) if i ∈ R2.
(45)
where PTi|T i−1UNY N is the conditional distribution induced
by the joint distribution of the RVs UN , V N and Y N (the
notation is again abbreviated similarly to (21)).
4) Achievability of the rate region (34)-(36): The rate of the
common message achieved by the construction in Sec. V-B1
is equal to
R0 =
1
mN
[
m|Iu|+ (m− 1)|D(1)|
]
.
As N increases, we obtain
m− 1
m
I(U ;Y ) ≤ R0 ≤ I(U ;Y ).
For sufficiently large m this quantity is arbitrarily close to the
common-message rate value given in (34). Note that we have
assumed that I(U ;Z) ≥ I(U ;Y ); to handle the opposite case
is suffices to interchange the roles of the pieces D(1) and D(2)
in the common-message encoding and decoding procedures.
As shown in [19], both receivers can decode the com-
mon message correctly with probability of error at most
mN2−N
β
, β ∈ (0, 1/2). This follows because in this stage,
Receivers 1 and 2 aim only at decoding the bits corresponding
to the index sets D(1) ∪ Iu = HU ∩ LU |Y and D(2) ∪ Iu =
HU ∩LU |Z , respectively. That these bits can be recovered in
a sucessive decoding procedure follows from the basic results
on polar codes [2], [4] and [12].
For the secret-message part of the communication the
properties of the scheme are characterized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 6. For any γ > 0,  > 0 and N → ∞ it
is possible to choose m so that the transmission scheme
described above attains a secrecy rate Rs such that Rs ≥
I(V ;Y |U) − I(V ;Z|U) − γ and the information leaked to
Receiver 2 satisfies the strong secrecy condition in Definition
V.2.
Proof. Assume that X,V, Y, Z are as given by Theorem 5.
The rate of proposed coding scheme is
m(|I| − |E|)
mN
=
(|HV |U ∩ LV |U,Y | − |HV |U ∩HcV |U,Z |)
N
which converges to I(V ;Y |U) − I(V ;Z|U) as N goes to
infinity. Recalling Theorem 5, we note that this is the target
value of the rate Rs for given U, V and X satisfying U →
V → X → Y,Z and PY |X = W1, PZ|X = W2.
Introduce the following RVs: Let Mm =
(M1,M2, . . . ,Mm) be a sequence of message bits
{ti, i ∈ I\E} sent in blocks 1, . . . ,m, and let
Zm = (ZN (1), . . . , ZN (m)) be the RVs that represent
the random observations of Receiver 2 upon transmitting
m blocks XN (j). Further, let Ej correspond to the bits
contained in the subset E(j) for all j = 1, . . . ,m.
Reliability: The proof of reliable decoding by Receiver
1 follows from the results of [12] and is very similar
to Sec. IV. Let PUNV NXNY NZN (uN , vN , xN , yN , zN ) ,∏N
i=1 PU,V,X,Y,Z(ui, vi, xi, yi, zi), where PUVXY Z is the
joint distribution of the RVs U, V,X, Y, Z appearing in The-
orem 5. Let P˜UN ,V N ,XN ,Y N ,ZN be the empirical distribution
induced by the transmission scheme if the deterministic rules
λi in both stages of the encoding are replaced by random
assignments such that, for a = 0, 1,
Pr(qi = a) = PQi|Qi−1(a|qi−1)
Pr(ti = a) = PTi|T i−1(a|ti−1)
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holds for the first and second stages, respectively. Here QN is
the RV defined in (38). Then, from the proof of Lemma 1 in
[12], it follows that
‖PUN − P˜UN ‖ ≤ N2−N
β
‖PV N |UN (.|uN )− P˜V N |UN (.|uN )‖ ≤ N2−N
β
,
the second estimate for every uN . Hence, we conclude that
‖PUNV N − P˜UNV N ‖ ≤ 2N2−N
β
‖PUNV NXNY NZN − P˜UNV NXNY NZN ‖ ≤ 2N2−N
β
holds for all the m blocks of transmission. Moreover, since
the message bits are entirely contained in the set of LV |U,Y ,
the successive decoding procedure (45) has the probability of
error bounded by
|PUNV NXNY N − P˜UNV NXNY N ‖
+
∑
i∈I
Z(Ti|T i−1, UN , Y N ) ≤ 3N2−Nβ
for each individual block. Thus, we observe that there exists
a family of deterministic rules λi for each stage such that the
overall error probability is at most 3mN2−N
β
, β ∈ (0, 1/2).
We conclude that the probability that Receiver 1 decodes the
information bits correctly approaches 1 as N goes to infinity.
Security: We will show that condition (2) is fulfilled for
the sequence of m blocks of transmission. Note that Receiver
2 observes not only a realization of Zm, but also estimates
the RVs Um = (UN (1), . . . , UN (m)) through procedure (43)-
(44). For this reason the strong security condition to be proved
takes the form
lim
N→∞
I(Mm; Um, Zm) = 0. (46)
The proof of (46) is very similar to the proof of strong secrecy
in Sec. IV. The counterparts of Lemmas 3 and 4 for the BCC
are provided below. The proofs are the same as the ones in
Sec. IV and will be omitted.
Lemma 7. Let T [A] = {ti, i ∈ A} and T [I\A] = {ti, i ∈
I\A}, where A is any subset of I. Then
I(T [I\A];T [A], UN , ZN ) = O(N32−Nβ ) (47)
Lemma 8. Let M j , (M1,M2, . . . ,Mj), Zj ,
(Z1, Z2, . . . , Zj), and U j , (U1, U2, . . . , Uj). Then, for all
j = 1, . . . ,m, we have
I(Ej ;M
j , U j , Zj) = O(jN32−N
β
) (48)
The rest of the proof also follows similarly to the proof in
Sec. IV. Repeating the inequalities which led to (32), we get
I(Mm; Um, Zm) ≤ I(Mm; Um, Zm, Em)
≤ I(Mm−1;Um−1, Zm−1, Em−1) +O(mN32−Nβ )
which implies
I(Mm; Um, Zm) ≤ I(Mm; Um, Zm, Em)
= O(m2N32−N
β
).
This completes the proof of (46).
Let us show that the “additional-message” rate R1 as given
by (36) is also achievable. We have seen that any rate pair
(R0, Rs) satisfying (34)-(35) is achievable in the system.
Moreover, observe that Receiver 1 decodes correctly messages
at the rate of min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)] according to (41)-(42),
and additionally decodes messages at the rate of I(V ;Y |U)
owing to the part of the encoding {ti, i ∈ J(1)} given by (39).
Since these two groups of information bits can be decoded
simultaneously by Receiver 1, we conclude that it is possible
to communicate to Receiver 1 an additional message at rate
R1.
Finally, we remind the reader that generalization of the
results presented in Sec. IV and Sec. V to nonbinary alphabets
is possible using a multitude of methods available in the
literature. For example, E. S¸as¸og˘lu [21, Ch.4] showed that
polarization phenomenon extends to all finite alphabets, prov-
ing also that the rate of polarization is 2−N
β
for β arbitrarily
close to 1/2. For the set of subchannels having capacity close
to 0, a similar result on the rate of convergence holds [13].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the wiretap channel
problem [29],[9]. We proved that the secrecy capacity Cs is
achievable by polar codes under the strong security constraint,
and without additional assumptions on the channel such as
symmetry or degreadedness. We also showed that it is possible
to build on this solution by adding a second layer of encoding
which enables one to attain the capacity region of the BCC
introduced by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner.
Our construction and the construction of [7] share some
common features. In particular, the two-layer chaining con-
struction for the BCC in our paper is equivalent to the chaining
construction appearing in [7]. In addition to that, [7] includes
a third layer of encoding to handle the channel prefixing
issue, i.e., the transition between the auxiliary RV V and the
real input X . Their construction also requires the use of pre-
shared common randomness (secret seed) which has vanishing
rate compared to the overall amount of communication. At
the same time, [7] bypasses the existence issue of good
deterministic maps of the type discussed in Sec. IIB by
allowing additional secure communication between the users
X and Y.
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